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ABSTRACT: For radical behaviorists, talk about ―private events‖ could be about any of 
four things: (a) private behavioral events, (b) physiology, (c) dispositions, or (d) 
explanatory fictions. Talk about private events as behavioral engages the influence of 
feelings, sensations, and covert operant behavior. Analyses based on private behavioral 
events allow radical behaviorists to understand how those events contribute to 
contingencies controlling subsequent operant behavior, whether verbal or nonverbal. Talk 
about private events in physiological terms risks confounding explanatory categories. 
Although physiology necessarily participates in behavioral events, physiological events are 
not the same type as behavioral events, public or private. Rather, an organism’s physiology 
is a material cause. To portray physiology as an autonomous, initiating cause, as traditional 
psychology often does, creates a variety of explanatory problems. Talk about private events 
as dispositions does not reflect anything literally private. Rather, dispositional talk reflects 
the probability of behavior engendered by contingencies. Dispositional talk is about effects, 
instead of causes or intervening variables as traditional psychology often portrays them. 
Finally, some talk ostensibly about private events is little more than an appeal to 
explanatory fictions. This talk, common in traditional psychology, owes its strength to the 
everyday social reinforcement inherent in ―folk psychology.‖ The talk represents a 
surrender to mentalism and methodological behaviorism, notwithstanding any claims that it 
is ―theoretical.‖ 
Key words: dispositions, explanatory fictions, mentalism, methodological behaviorism, 
neuroscience, private behavioral events 
Introduction 
Structurally, private events are held to be inside the skin in some sense and 
accessible to only one person. Functionally, private events are held to be causally 
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related to subsequent behavior. However, different theoretical positions in 
psychology hold correspondingly different positions with respect to both structural 
issues—the dimensions of private events, and functional issues—and the nature of 
their causal relation to subsequent behavior.  
A brief review of representative viewpoints in the history of psychology 
illustrates that concern about private events is longstanding. For example, in the 
late nineteenth century, such nascent viewpoints in psychology as Wundt’s 
voluntarism, Titchener’s structuralism, and American functionalism struggled 
heroically to distinguish themselves from philosophy and physiology and to 
become sciences in their own right. In keeping with the social–cultural 
assumptions of the time, these viewpoints assumed that the phenomena of mental 
life were the principal subject matter for psychology, rather than behavioral events. 
At best, behavioral events were assumed to be a subordinate subject matter, such 
that an understanding of behavioral events would come about once the workings of 
the conscious mind were revealed. As many readers know, structural psychologists 
used reaction times, ratiocinations, various forms of complex judgments, and 
especially introspective reports to determine how sensations, images, and feelings 
were organized in mental life. Only adults could serve as subjects. These subjects 
were extensively trained so that they would only describe their mental experiences, 
rather than make inferences about them and thereby commit the ―stimulus error.‖ 
Functionalists were similarly concerned with the various constituents of mental 
life, although more with their functional benefit than their organization. The 
various positions debated whether imageless thought was possible and whether 
reaction time was faster if one concentrated on the stimulus or the response. 
Throughout, an important challenge was whether the way these early viewpoints 
dealt with mental life could legitimately be called ―scientific.‖ In response to this 
challenge, early researchers argued that because they conducted research with 
well-trained subjects under well-controlled conditions and carefully recorded the 
data, their investigations of mental life were, in fact, empirical enough to count as 
being scientific. 
Despite the self-confident claims of researchers associated with these early 
viewpoints, history suggests that the viewpoints were regrettably problematic. For 
example, their supposed ―findings‖ tended to be unreliable and incapable of 
generating agreement. In addition, their findings did not lend themselves 
comfortably to practical applications. Introspection seemed particularly 
questionable as a method. Skeptics further raised concerns that science is 
traditionally held to be empirical. It deals with phenomena that are publicly 
observable, such that they can be counted, measured, weighed, or otherwise 
objectively recorded on counters, meters, dials, pointers, or scales. By definition, 
the private events of mental life are not publicly observable. They are ―subjective,‖ 
not ―objective.‖ Thus, the status of a science purporting to examine private events 
raises special questions. Can an understanding of private events, not to mention the 
behavior that supposedly follows from those events, even be achieved through the 
methods of science? Aren’t the various problems just a symptom of trying to make 





science? Shouldn’t researchers just acknowledge the importance of private events, 
then humbly defer either in part or whole to another mode of inquiry, such as 
philosophy, if they want to investigate them more deeply? Indeed, these 
reservations about the ―scientific‖ status of private events, mental life, and even the 
possibility of a science of behavior continue in many quarters. 
The historical record indicates that behaviorism grew in part from concerns 
about empiricism, reliability, observability, objectivity, and agreement that were 
expressed during the first quarter of the twentieth century, for example, in the 
writings of John B. Watson (e.g., 1913). Consequently, behaviorism is commonly 
thought of as a position that says nothing about private events and talks only about 
publicly observable relations between publicly observable stimuli and responses, 
all in an effort to avoid the problems of the earlier viewpoints based on 
introspection. By virtue of its foundational emphasis on empiricism and publicly 
observable data, behaviorism is thought to have stronger credentials than 
introspective viewpoints on which to lay claim to status as a science. 
To be sure, Watson was clearly interested in empiricism, reliability, 
observability, objectivity, and agreement. However, even though Watson (1913, p. 
174) eschewed ―centrally initiated processes,‖ he (1925) talked at great length 
about some of the topics that had previously been the province of introspective 
psychology. He viewed them as implicit, respondent relations involving punctate 
stimuli arising from verbal, visceral, and motor systems. These phenomena were 
peripheral rather than central, but they were not publicly observable, at least 
without instrumental amplification. One example is Watson’s view of thinking as 
subvocal speech related to implicit activity in the larynx, jaw, mouth, lips, and 
tongue. Another is Watson’s view of lust as tingling in the external genitals. 
Despite its early benefits, Watson’s classical S–R behaviorism had difficulty 
accounting for the variability and apparent spontaneity of behavior. Sometimes 
particular stimuli and particular responses just weren’t correlated in the way that 
classical behaviorism required. In the face of these difficulties, researchers began 
to propose a wide variety of internal, causally effective antecedents to overcome 
the restrictions of dealing with only publicly observable stimuli and responses in 
the mode of classical S–R behaviorism. These internal, unobservable factors better 
allowed researchers to deal with the matters of variability and spontaneity. One 
sense of ―causally effective‖ is that of an autonomous, initiating power or force. 
An assumption of the autonomous, initiating power of internal factors is certainly a 
legacy of dualism, if not dualism itself, although outright appeals to dualistic 
causes were generally in the minority.  
In the majority were appeals to another sense of ―causally effective,‖ that of 
mediation. By mediation is meant that external stimuli activate some intervening, 
internal process or entity (i.e., a private event) that is causally connected in a 
complex but systematic way to an eventual response, and the mediating process or 
entity is the proper focus of psychological science rather than the response itself. In 
other words, the response is functionally related to the mediator rather than the 
environment because the organism is held to be in direct contact with only the 
mediator rather than the environment. Interestingly, the origin and nature of the 
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mediators were never fully examined. Whether the mediators actually differed 
from dualistic causes was not clear. The extent to which the mediators differed 
from the acts, states, and so on of the introspective psychology that flourished 
some 30 or 40 years earlier was similarly not clear. In any case, appeals to a 
variety of mediating internal processes or entities became widely accepted as a 
satisfactory way to retain the virtues of classical S–R behaviorism but 
accommodate the variability and nominal spontaneity of behavior. The approach 
that developed based on mediation may be termed mediational S–O–R 
neobehaviorism to distinguish it from Watson’s classical S–R behaviorism, and 
this mediational form of behaviorism soon became dominant (Moore, 2008; see 
also Watkins, 1990, who raises concerns about mediation from a traditional 
perspective, although for radical behaviorism these concerns stop short of a 
decisive indictment). 
As the story unfolded during the 1930s and 1940s, a major problem for 
mediational neobehaviorists was how to achieve and maintain scientific 
respectability when appealing to the mediating organismic entities. The solution 
was operationism. Mediational neobehaviorists came to render the intervening 
organismic entities as ―theoretical terms‖ as opposed to observational terms 
referring to publicly observable stimuli and responses. Mediational neobehaviorists 
then ―operationally defined‖ the theoretical terms by symbolically linking them to 
some publicly observable state of affairs in connection with which they were 
supposedly measured. A common approach was to operationally define the 
mediators by referring to classically conditioned physiological states (e.g., 
Mowrer, 1947). 
In short, this conventional interpretation of operationism allowed mediational 
neobehaviorists to have their cake and eat it too. They could account for the 
variability and apparent spontaneity of behavior. They could avoid the liabilities of 
introspective psychology and generate agreement by linking their talk of private 
events to publicly observable events. They could maintain all their prior 
assumptions concerning the necessity of incorporating a wide variety of concepts 
about events taking place somewhere else, at some other level of observation, 
described in different terms, and measured, if at all, in different dimensions. They 
could conceive of the mediating private phenomena as ―hypothetical constructs‖ 
that were distinctly nonbehavioral. As the twentieth century progressed, 
neobehaviorists could conceive of the private phenomena as computational states 
of cognitive information processing mechanisms or as metaphors framed in the 
language of neuroscience to further enhance respectability and face validity. 
Advances in technology meant that neobehaviorists could even record or take 
pictures of brain activity and argue that the massively processed data or images 
―explained‖ why humans might or might not engage in some form of behavior. 
Neobehaviorists could receive lots of supportive public attention from the many 
others who took it for granted that their viewpoint was essentially so correct that 
only the most obtuse person would argue against it. They could get privileged 
access to academic journals for their publications and to extramural funds for their 





their institutions or agencies by calling their efforts ―theoretical,‖ ―hypothetical,‖ 
or ―conceptual,‖ but still present themselves as aligned with the rigorous thinking 
promoted under the banner of behaviorism. Clearly, then, this dominant form of 
behaviorism has always been intimately concerned with private phenomena. 
Indeed, it is explicitly committed to dealing with a particular conception of them. 
Skinner’s radical behaviorism also has something to say about private events. 
However, what radical behaviorists say and why they say it differ appreciably from 
what mediational neobehaviorists say and why they say it (Skinner, 1945, 1953). 
For instance, radical behaviorists talk in terms of operant behavioral processes and 
the control by consequences rather than linear antecedent causation with mediators 
from other dimensions. Radical behaviorism is, therefore, a thoroughgoing 
behaviorism that doesn’t appeal to events in other dimensions. Thus, just because 
both neobehaviorists and radical behaviorists have something to say about private 
events does not mean that all forms of behaviorism are equivalent. In any case, 
further examination of why the radical behaviorist conception of private events is 
interesting, relevant, and important will clarify the differences. 
Private Events from the Standpoint of Radical Behaviorism 
Radical behaviorists call for the operational analysis of talk about private 
events to assess what that talk is about. For radical behaviorists, an operational 
analysis consists of assessing the factors that control the verbal behavior in 
question. This interpretation of operationism is based on a genuinely behavioral 
view of verbal behavior, and it differs significantly from the conventional 
interpretation that is based on a symbolic, referential view (Skinner, 1945). For 
radical behaviorists, then, talk about private events can be about (a) private 
behavioral events, (b) physiological events, (c) the probability of engaging in 
certain forms of behavior, or (d) explanatory fictions. An operational analysis will 
determine the extent to which these factors actually do control the talk in question 
as well as the role of the factors in contingencies controlling further operant 
behavior, whether nonverbal or verbal.  
Talk about Private Events as Private Behavioral Events 
Some talk about private events is about bodily conditions, sensations, and 
feelings, or covert operant behavior, as those events occur in a context. This talk is 
about private behavioral events. An important implication is that for radical 
behaviorists, the concept of a behavioral event is not limited to something that is 
publicly observable (Moore, 2008). Radical behaviorists must then account for 
how environmental circumstances produce the conditions of the body in question, 
how the covert operant behavior assumes the form it does, and how the conditions 
of the body and the covert behavior acquire the effects they do with respect to 
subsequent verbal or nonverbal behavior. People can clearly be said to have 
feelings. What are feelings, how do they come about, and what role do they play in 
subsequent behavior? People can clearly be said to think. What is thinking, how 
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does it come about, and what role does it play in subsequent behavior? People can 
clearly be said to make introspective statements. What are introspective statements 
about? How do people come to make such statements? For radical behaviorism, 
the phenomena and processes in question are all behavioral, and answers are to be 
found in the behavioral dimension. Unlike statements in traditional psychology, 
these statements are not about causally effective antecedents from another 
dimension, as either initiators or mediators. 
Private Behavioral Events: Sensations and Feelings 
For radical behaviorists, there are two sorts of private behavioral events. The 
first sort concerns the influence of sensations and feelings. These events are 
internal, ―inside the skin‖ in some sense, and inaccessible to others. What causes 
this sort of private event? These events are conditions of the body caused by 
unconditioned and conditioned respondent relations. What is their causal status, for 
example, with respect to subsequent operant behavior? The vernacular often has it 
that people do things because they ―feel like it.‖ For radical behaviorists, feelings 
or sensations do not cause subsequent operant behavior in sense of an autonomous, 
initiating cause. Rather, the events or relations that cause the feelings or sensations 
also cause the subsequent operant behavior. For example, the feeling called anxiety 
does not cause subsequent behavior. Rather, the events and relations that cause the 
feeling called anxiety cause subsequent behavior. Similarly, the good feeling 
associated with a reinforcer doesn’t strengthen behavior; the good feeling and the 
strengthening of behavior are both caused by the reinforcer, and an effective 
identification of the causal sequence must go back to the reinforcer. Of course, the 
feelings or sensations participate in the contingencies by contributing to the 
discriminative control over the verbal behavior that describes the feelings or 
sensations. However, this view differs from one that endows feelings or sensations 
with autonomous, initiating, or mediational power to cause either verbal or 
nonverbal operant behavior (e.g., Catania & Harnad, 1988, p. 354). 
The interesting, relevant, and important question is how do individuals come 
to verbally label sensations and feelings, or otherwise give introspective reports, 
given the problem of privacy (Skinner, 1945)? The problem of privacy may be 
summarized as follows. Verbal behavior develops through the differential 
reinforcement supplied by the verbal community. That is, an individual learns to 
label one color as red and another as green when saying red in the presence of a 
red object and green in the presence of a green object meet with approval from 
others. In this case, the antecedent conditions that will control the response are 
public. Both the verbal community and the individual are in contact with the red 
and green objects as antecedent conditions, and the verbal community can use the 
presence of the objects as a basis for administering the required differential 
reinforcement. However, in the case of verbal behavior descriptive of sensations or 
feelings, the verbal community operates at a disadvantage. The antecedent 
conditions are private, not public. The verbal community does not have direct 





about them based on direct contact with the appropriate antecedent conditions, as it 
can when the individual learns to name colors. Nevertheless, a moment’s reflection 
suggests that individuals do learn to generate responses that are under the 
discriminative control of private stimuli. How does the verbal community supply 
the necessary differential reinforcement in this case? The answer is clearly relevant 
to parents, who might want to have their children accurately describe their aches 
and pains, so that the parents can provide some remedy. 
For radical behaviorists, the verbal community can work its way around the 
problem of privacy and administer the necessary differential reinforcement in two 
ways. The first way is by relying on public accompaniments (Skinner, 1945). 
According to this way, the verbal community will reinforce talk of being in pain 
when there has been some publicly observable concomitant, as when an individual 
has received a forceful blow, or fallen and skinned a knee. The prevalence of this 
mode is evident in the metaphorical nature of pain talk. Speakers are taught to call 
the pains caused by sharp objects as sharp pains, those caused by dull objects as 
dull pains, and those caused by burning objects as burning pains. Excruciating 
pains come from (ex-) being crucified. 
The second way is by relying on collateral responses (Skinner, 1945). 
According to this way, the verbal community will reinforce talk of being in pain 
when the individual grasps or rubs some obviously afflicted area. The act itself 
might be an unconditioned respondent or it might be related to negative 
reinforcement of pain relief. 
A third way verbal behavior descriptive of feelings and sensations could 
develop is on the basis of stimulus generalization. Internal stimulation arising from 
overt events might initially acquire some measure of stimulus control over verbal 
behavior on the basis of public accompaniments or collateral responses as 
described above. Related forms of internal stimulation arising from publicly 
observable events might then exert stimulus control in later cases as a function of 
their resemblance to the original stimulation (Skinner, 1945). For example, 
consider how a speaker might come to say ―I have a feeling of butterflies in my 
stomach.‖ Speakers might initially learn to describe the sensation that occurs when 
a butterfly lands on their skin as light and fluttering. When the light and fluttering 
properties of internal stimulation in the stomach are similar to those caused by the 
publicly observable event of a butterfly landing on the skin, a similar verbal 
response will occur through the process of stimulus generalization. Thus, just as 
speakers learn to say ―I have a feeling of butterflies on my arm‖ on the basis of the 
light and fluttering stimulation, they will say ―I have a feeling of butterflies in my 
stomach‖ when stimulation with similar properties occurs in their stomachs. 
The radical behaviorist argument is that as a result of these social processes, 
individuals learn to ―know themselves‖ in an interesting and meaningful way, 
including the knowing of their own feelings and sensations. Introspective reports 
concern these feelings and the conditions that cause them rather than private 
autonomous, initiating causes from another dimension to which a speaker has 
privileged access. What then about the ―awareness‖ of one’s own feelings and 
sensations? In the sense that awareness also depends on particular circumstances, 
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individuals might not be aware that they are injured if the injury occurs in a life-or-
death emergency, if the injury concerns a soldier who is fighting on the battlefield, 
or if the injury concerns an athlete who is involved in a competitive event. 
Similarly, an individual shuffling hurriedly through a stack of papers to meet a 
deadline might not notice the relatively minor discomfort associated with a paper 
cut on the finger until the individual notices a drop of blood. The demands of the 
current setting conflict with the awareness of the pain, such that the awareness 
comes only later, after the demands of the emergency or critical situation have 
passed.  
Complicating the descriptions of feelings and sensations are the limitations of 
the nervous system itself. Human exteroceptive nervous systems are reasonably 
well developed, but consider the process of hearing. The typical range of human 
hearing is from 20 Hz to 20,000 Hz. Given these limits, individuals can’t sense—
let alone distinguish between—auditory frequencies of 25,000 Hz and 30,000 Hz 
because their exteroceptive nervous system doesn’t allow them to come in contact 
with that sort of stimulation. Similarly, with respect to the interoceptive nervous 
system, individuals often have trouble localizing pains or giving other than 
metaphorical descriptions of pains. The interoceptive nervous system simply 
doesn’t have enough nerves, or doesn’t have nerves going to the right places, to 
allow individuals to come into contact with the precise nature of the stimulation. 
Individuals may well come up with elaborate descriptions of pains, but often those 
descriptions are based more on social convention or various metaphorical relations 
than actual contact with the condition of the body purportedly affected. The result 
is that both the problem of privacy, mentioned earlier, and the inherent limitations 
of the nervous system restrict the accuracy of many self-reports. It follows that the 
elaborate introspective descriptions in older forms of psychology, as well as in 
current forms for that matter, are not as veridical as they claim. 
To be sure, the processes described above don’t always work in the way the 
verbal community intends. Sometimes individuals learn to hold an area and moan 
and groan, and by so doing evoke sympathy from others. They learn they can avoid 
unpleasant tasks by pretending to be in pain and by engaging in a form of behavior 
that often is functionally related to pain, but in the present case is actually not. The 
terms ―hypochondria‖ and ―malingering‖ are typically applied to these cases. 
Similarly, neurotics achieve secondary gains by assuming the role of a ―sick 
person‖ and having others sympathize with them. The importance of public 
concomitants in the discernment of pain by the verbal community is evidenced 
when malingerers are found out. They complain that they are too sick or in too 
much pain to be assigned to some demanding task, or even to get out of bed, but 
then are discredited when they are later discovered to be doing something equally 
vigorous but enjoyable. The collateral responses don’t correlate with the verbal 





Private Behavioral Events: Covert Behavior 
The second sort of private behavioral event concerns the influence of covert 
operant behavior (Skinner, 1945). Thinking is a convenient example. To think is to 
behave, but at a covert level. This sort of private event functions as a link in a 
causal chain of behavior. Again, these private events are not causal in the sense of 
an autonomous, initiating cause or a mediating process. Rather, they function as 
discriminative stimulation for subsequent behavior, either verbal or nonverbal, 
either public or private (Skinner, 1953, 1957). 
These private forms of behavior are acquired in overt form, but then become 
covert. As covert forms of behavior, they are executed by same neuromuscular 
substrate as the overt form. However, they are smaller in scale, such that they are 
not ordinarily observable to anyone else (Skinner, 1953). To be sure, through 
instrumental amplification they may become evident to others. One currently 
intriguing example is when a computer-based transducer system translates brain 
waves so that they move a pointer on a computer monitor, such as might be 
involved in playing a simple computer game, or so that they move an artificial 
limb via ―neural prosthetics‖ (Aaron et. al., 2006). However, no matter how well 
these events may be revealed in the laboratory, in the normal situation the forms of 
behavior are quite private, and their source and causal contribution need to be 
accounted for (Skinner, 1945). 
Such responses become covert for any of several reasons. For example, the 
overt form might be punished. Reading aloud is punished in the library. 
Consequently, one reads silently. The covert form might be more efficient and 
labor-saving when compared with the overt form. One can often read silently faster 
than aloud. However, reading aloud might return if a punishing audience is not 
present and one is interested in sounding out a difficult verbal passage. The overt 
form might lack environmental support. One can write down a grocery list if one 
has paper and pencil. If one does not, privately reminding oneself what one needs 
to buy is just as effective. As a result, the behavior may recede to a covert or 
inchoate form, and even incipient stages can produce covert stimulation that exerts 
a discriminative effect. 
How do individuals come into contact with the covert form of the behavior? 
The answer is that interoceptive and proprioceptive properties of the covert form 
resemble those of the overt, although reduced in magnitude. Individuals make 
contact with the covert behavior via interoceptive and proprioceptive nervous 
systems at the central as well as peripheral level. 
According to this view, consciousness may be viewed as responding to one’s 
own behavior and the conditions of which that behavior is a function, rather than a 
mediating mental state. In many instances consciousness means self-descriptive 
behavior. It comes about when the verbal community questions what an individual 
is doing and why, and then reinforcers appropriate responses. Introspective 
statements may well be comments on inner states, but those states are not causes in 
themselves, apart from the external circumstances that produce the states. Given 
that consciousness is created by social interactions, it follows that more precise 
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interactions can create more effective self-management repertoires, and more 
conscious individuals (Skinner, 1945). 
What is the causal status of the covert behavior? Again, for radical 
behaviorism the answer depends on the meaning given to causal. The vernacular 
holds that thinking is variously an autonomous, initiating, or mediating cause of 
behavior, although the origin of thinking is not routinely specified. Radical 
behaviorism rejects these conceptions of thinking. At the very least, one has to 
identify the circumstances that caused the thinking. Rather, radical behaviorists 
argue that both the thinking and subsequent behavior are caused by the same 
circumstances. As suggested earlier, thinking makes its contribution to subsequent 
behavior through its participation in discriminative control. By thinking, one 
produces discriminative stimulation that adds to the multiplicity of stimuli that 
guide subsequent behavior. Again, however, one has to account for the source of 
the thinking as well as how the thinking might actually come to exert 
discriminative control. 
In sum, covert behavior can therefore be just as relevant to the analysis of 
behavior as it occurs in context as is overt behavior. However, covert behavior 
does not necessarily occur in every instance of behavior. Even when covert 
behavior does occur, it may not be functionally related to subsequent behavior, 
either covert or overt. Nevertheless, when covert behavior does occur and when it 
does influence subsequent behavior, its occurrence and influence need to be 
accounted for. Radical behaviorism does so in terms of ongoing operant processes, 
consistent with the principles of a natural science. The radical behaviorist position 
is therefore not equivalent to mentalism for several reasons (e.g., Zuriff, 1985): 
 
1. Private behavioral events are in the same dimension as public behavioral   
events; they are not in a different dimension.  
2. Private behavioral events obey the same laws as public behavioral events. 
3. Private behavioral events have the same properties as public behavioral 
events. 
4. Private behavioral events are functionally related to publicly observable 
environmental variables and relations, behavioral variables and relations, or 
both; private behavioral events are not autonomous, initiating, or mediating 
in the traditional sense. 
Talk about Private Events as Physiological Events 
Other talk about private events is about underlying physiological structures, 
pathways, and processes. These events are studied by neuroscience. They are 
investigated using the techniques and concepts of that discipline, rather than as 
inferences from observed behavior. With respect to an enthusiastic bridge player, 
the situation is not improved by pointing to the operation of brain structures in an 
fMRI as evidence justifying ―theoretical‖ talk of a subjective mental state of 
―enthusiasm‖ that causes the individual to play and talk about bridge often. Indeed, 





causally effective antecedents from other dimensions. If anything, the states of 
physiological structures are effects rather than correlational evidence of the kind of 
mental causes to which traditional views might appeal. 
To be sure, physiological information—for instance, about cortical structures 
as revealed in an fMRI—could conceivably be important. Information about the 
physiological processes that transpire in two ―gaps‖ in a purely behavioral account 
is clearly relevant to an understanding of behavior. One gap is during an event, 
when a given stimulus leads to a given response. A second gap is between events, 
when one event affects the probability of behavior in future, similar circumstances. 
Information about physiological events during these gaps may help to identify new 
possibilities for prediction and control of behavior through an intervention. 
However, the physiological events studied in neuroscience are not the same type of 
private behavioral events in which radical behaviorists are interested. This view of 
the importance of physiological information differs from the traditional conception 
of saying that an fMRI provides evidence of causal cognitive mechanisms or 
states. Indeed, the traditional conception of causal cognitive mechanisms is related 
more to social–cultural ideas of autonomous, initiating, or mediating powers and 
forces than to modern scientific conceptions of the role of physiology (e.g., 
Bennett & Hacker, 2003; Uttal, 2001). 
The point remains that as covert behavior of either respondent or operant 
character, private behavioral events are not to be ―reduced‖ to physiology or 
activity of cortical structures, any more than any other kind of behavior is to be 
reduced to physiology or activity of cortical structures (see related discussions in 
Stemmer, 2001, 2003). Private behavioral events are a function of the 
environmental circumstances in which they occur. The full analysis of private 
behavioral events relates the behavior in question to those circumstances. To be 
sure, physiological events necessarily participate in every behavioral event, public 
or private, but as material causes, not efficient causes (Moore, 2008). However, 
even though peristalsis, action potentials in affector or effector systems, cortical 
activity, or even neural networks cast as parallel distributed processing systems are 
clearly worthy of investigation in their own right, they are not necessarily private 
behavioral events, at least as radical behaviorists conceive of them. 
Talk about Private Events as Dispositional 
Still other talk about private events takes the grammatical and syntactical 
form of being about something private, but the talk is not literally about anything 
private. Rather, the talk is occasioned by a repertoire of publicly observable 
behavior, the probability of engaging in certain forms of behavior in that 
repertoire, and perhaps also certain properties of those forms. This talk is 
dispositional, to use a conventional term. For example, to say that certain 
individuals have great ―enthusiasm‖ for playing bridge is to make a dispositional 
statement saying that the individuals play and talk about bridge often. For radical 
behaviorists, the frequency with which the individuals play and talk about bridge is 
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attributable to the contingencies they have experienced. Another example is 
―beliefs‖: 
Our belief that there is cheese in the icebox is a function of, or identical with, 
our tendency to go to the icebox when we are hungry for cheese, other things 
being equal. . . .Our belief in what someone tells us is similarly a function of, or 
identical with, our tendency to act upon the verbal stimulus he provides. If we 
have always been successful when responding with respect to his verbal 
behavior, our belief will be strong. (Skinner, 1957, pp. 159-160) 
Therefore, dispositional statements are actually about effects, rather than 
causes. 
Related to dispositional usage are several common phrases in everyday 
language. One example is ―I think. . .,‖ as in ―I think it is going to rain today.‖ The 
phrase is ordinarily a comment on the strength of a response, given some set of 
prevailing environmental conditions. The speaker is commenting that the cloud 
formations, wind conditions, and humidity have been highly correlated with rain in 
the past, although the correlation is something less than 1.0. The speaker is not 
commenting on some nonbehavioral, mental entity called a ―thought‖ that is ―had.‖ 
When the correlation is even lower, the speaker might state ―I wonder if it is going 
to rain today.‖ Again, the speaker is not commenting as a result of some 
nonspecific mental process called ―wondering.‖ When the correlation is even 
higher, the speaker might state, ―I know it is going to rain today.‖ Here, the 
speaker’s statement is not caused by a mental state of ―having knowledge,‖ which 
would need to be verified by some other measuring technique. In no case is any 
statement a result of private, mental processes or entities that supposedly cause 
behavior, verbal or otherwise. 
Importantly, there is no other dimension than the behavioral dimension. Thus, 
to say that the individuals have a private entity called ―enthusiasm‖ that is inside 
their skins in a subjective or mental dimension and that causes them to play and 
talk often about bridge is to go beyond a descriptive statement and reveal the 
influence of the social–cultural traditions of folk psychology. What has happened? 
The root term of enthusiasm presumably started out as either an adverb as 
adjective. In its adverbial form (―enthusiastically‖), the word describes the manner 
in which someone plays bridge. In its adjectival form (―enthusiastic‖), the word 
describes the characteristics of someone who plays bridge. The adverbial and 
adjectival forms are therefore occasioned by certain properties of responses 
making up a repertoire. The properties of responses in the repertoire are 
functionally related to the contingencies that cause the responses in question. 
Unfortunately, the adverbial or adjectival form is then converted to a noun. 
Through the influence of social–cultural tradition, which mandates looking inside 
individuals for the autonomous, initiating cause of their behavior, the noun is taken 
to refer to a causal private entity or state in another dimension that individuals 
possess. A verbal transformation sends psychologists off looking in another 
dimension for the causal entity to which the noun is said to refer, and the whole 





of traditional psychology rests on such a view, and radical behaviorism vigorously 
opposes it. 
The topic of dispositions is central to much of the analysis of psychological 
positions carried out in philosophical psychology. According to philosophical 
psychology, behaviorism is a position that translates statements about private 
events into statements about dispositions. Dispositions are then defined in terms of 
their relation to observable behavior to be respectable or meaningful. The resulting 
position is often called ―philosophical behaviorism.‖ On this view, to be in pain is 
to be disposed to engage in publicly observable, pain-related behavior. Embracing 
a cognitive orientation, Fodor (1968) criticizes behaviorism for rendering private 
events (note that Fodor calls them ―mental predicates‖) ultimately in behavioral 
terms: 
To qualify as a behaviorist in the broad sense of that term that I shall employ, 
one need only believe that the following proposition expresses a necessary truth: 
For each mental predicate that can be employed in a psychological explanation, 
there must be at least one description of [publicly observable] behavior to which 
it bears a[n exhaustive] logical connection. I shall henceforth refer to this 
proposition as P. . . .A mentalist is, then, simply someone who denies 
―necessarily P‖. . . .The distinction between mentalism and behaviorism is both 
exclusive and exhaustive. (pp. 51, 55) 
Fodor’s reasoning is that dispositional talk by behaviorism fails to recognize 
the direct, causal relevance of private, internal states, which cognitive orientations 
argue is necessary. His reasoning further challenges what he takes as the 
underlying premise in philosophical behaviorism—namely, that first-person 
statements about being in pain are meaningful only if individuals have somehow 
reached a conclusion based on the observation of first, their own inner state, and 
second, their own subsequent actions. Fodor’s comments target such positions as 
the logical behaviorism of Carnap and Hempel (Kitchener, 1999), the conceptual 
analysis of Ryle (1949), and perhaps even Wittgenstein (1953/1973), although 
Wittgenstein preferred to talk of ―natural expressions‖ of pain. 
Ironically, the criticism does not apply to even neobehaviorism. The move in 
neobehaviorism of linguistically converting adjectives and adverbs to nouns ends 
up institutionalizing the appeal to inner causes from other dimensions and 
investing the terms with a meaning beyond any reference to observable behavior. 
Thus, Moore (2008) points out that neobehaviorism ends up being consistent with 
mental or cognitive orientations, instead of distinct from them as Fodor (1968) 
claimed. Although various forms of mediational neobehaviorism typically make 
such linguistic moves, radical behaviorism does not, as indicated by its view of 
private behavioral events. Therefore, radical behaviorism is clearly not equivalent 
to these other forms of behaviorism. It further follows that Fodor’s claim does not 
apply to radical behaviorism, since what counts as behavior in radical behaviorism 
is not restricted to a publicly observable event. 
MOORE 
34 
Talk about Private Events as Explanatory Fictions 
Finally, some talk about private events reflects the influence of factors of 
social–cultural origin that are cherished for irrelevant and extraneous reasons, 
perhaps as unwarranted metaphors from language patterns or fictional distortions. 
This sort of talk involves explanatory fictions. As described earlier, talk invoking 
dispositions as causes is a special instance of this sort. The source of talk involving 
explanatory fictions lies more in the social–cultural reinforcement for the traditions 
of ―folk psychology‖ than in any factors in space and time that researchers can 
manipulate to affect behavior.  
The hallmark of statements of this sort is the appeal to private phenomena 
from other dimensions as causally effective antecedents. The private phenomena 
are invested with just exactly the causal powers and forces necessary to explain the 
behavior in question. Representative terms used in conjunction with this 
conception of private causal phenomena are acts, states, mechanisms, processes, 
entities, and structures. Representative terms used in conjunction with the other 
dimensions are mental, cognitive, psychic, spiritual, subjective, hypothetical, and 
conceptual. To also be included are statements appealing to physiological 
structures as autonomous and initiating causally effective antecedents, or, 
alternatively, statements in which physiological structures are simply proxies for 
causal acts, states, mechanisms, processes, entities, or structures from other 
dimensions. Such statements may be traced at least as far back as the era of 
introspective psychology. For radical behaviorists, the whole approach may be 
designated as mentalism. Talk of such mentalistic explanatory fictions may be 
dismissed as ineffective when it comes to the prediction and control of behavior, 
except, of course, if one is interested in the social–cultural reinforcement that 
promotes such talk and induces individuals to accept the talk as explanatory. 
Statements involving explanatory fictions are prominent in traditional 
psychology. The traditional view simply takes it for granted that private events 
take place in a dimension that differs from the one in which publicly observable 
behavior takes place. Private events are therefore held to be explicitly 
nonbehavioral. The traditional view further takes it for granted that an 
understanding of what these private events are, as well as an understanding of how 
they cause publicly observable behavior, are necessarily involved in an 
understanding of the human condition. Finally, the traditional view takes it for 
granted that any intellectual position that presumes to adequately comment in a 
causal way on the human condition must come to grips with private events, as it 
seeks to explain behavior. 
An entire methodology has evolved to support this view, based on attempts to 
deal scientifically with private events. The position is called methodological 
behaviorism. Methodological behaviorism is the position that in psychological 
science, one can comment directly only on things that are publicly observable. 
Inasmuch as the mediating private events invoked by neobehaviorism (which are 
the outgrowth of the factors described earlier in this paper) are not publicly 





as theoretical terms such as hypothetical constructs. As described at the beginning 
of this article, these private events then needed to be operationally defined. The 
public event served as the proxy for the private, giving ―theoretical‖ license to the 
appeal to the private phenomena. Thus, the commitment to a conventional 
interpretation of operationism forged a link that virtually equated mediational  
S–O–R neobehaviorism and methodological behaviorism under the guise of 
―theory.‖ 
To be certain, an approach restricted to publicly observable factors was 
thought to safeguard the scientific character of psychology as a science. However, 
history reveals that the particular way the restriction was implemented has been, 
and indeed continues to be, troublesome. Moore (2008) pointed out that this 
restriction has only preserved the old dualistic explanatory fictions unharmed—in 
some cases (e.g., S. S. Stevens) quite unselfconsciously—instead of banishing 
them. The number of contemporary psychologists who are seduced by professional 
contingencies into promoting mentalistic explanatory fictions as theory is 
regrettably large. Even more regrettable is that most don’t even recognize they are 
so seduced. 
Radical behaviorists do not distinguish between observational and theoretical 
terms in their analyses of verbal behavior (Moore, 2008). As mentioned earlier in 
this paper, such a distinction is based on a referential, symbolic view of verbal 
behavior rather than a genuinely behavioral view. Accordingly, radical 
behaviorists do not render private events as theoretical terms such as hypothetical 
constructs from other dimensions, which then need to be operationally defined in 
terms of observables to be legitimate. Again, private events are real behavioral 
events, and they are either respondent or operant in character. They are no more 
hypothetical than salivation or lever presses are hypothetical. To be sure, radical 
behaviorists may not currently have access to private events of others, but maybe 
with improved technology the access will come about. The boundary between 
public and private is not fixed. In the meantime, although radical behaviorists may 
have to deal inferentially with the private events of others, an individual’s own 
private events are not an inference for the individual in question (Skinner, 1953). 
In short, Moore (2008) has described the problems created by conceptions of 
private events as mentalistic explanatory fictions derived from folk psychology as 
follows: 
 
1. They interfere with effective prediction and control of behavior.  
2. They obscure important details. 
3. They misrepresent the facts to be accounted for. 
4. They impede the search for genuinely relevant variables. 
5. They allay curiosity by getting people to accept the postulation of fanciful 
and fictitious entities as explanations. 
6. They give false assurances about the state of our knowledge.  
7. They lead to the continued use of scientific techniques that should be 
abandoned, such as the hypothetico-deductive method, because those 
techniques are wasteful and ultimately ineffective. 
MOORE 
36 
Summary and Conclusions 
For radical behaviorists, talk ostensibly about ―private events‖ could be about 
any of four things. First, the talk could be about private behavioral events. This 
talk reflects the way that sensations and feelings, as well as covert operants, 
influence subsequent nonverbal and verbal behavior. These events may not be 
accessible to others. Nevertheless, they are critical to understanding behavior in all 
its complexity. An important matter is that this talk is concerned with behavioral 
phenomena in the one dimension.  
Second, the talk could be about physiological events. Physiological events are 
also not ordinarily accessible to others. In addition, physiological events 
necessarily participate in every behavioral event, public or private. However, for 
radical behaviorists a physiological event is not the same type of event as a private 
behavioral event. More particularly, an organism’s physiology is a material cause. 
This sense of causation contrasts with that commonly seen in traditional 
psychology, which formulates physiological factors as autonomous or initiating 
causes of behavior. 
Third, the talk could appear to be about private events, but it is not literally 
about anything private. Rather, the talk is actually about the probability of 
engaging in publicly observable behavior. This talk is said to be dispositional. 
Importantly, for radical behaviorists dispositional talk is about the effects of 
contingencies. This sense of dispositions contrasts with that of traditional 
psychology, which routinely formulates dispositions as initiating or mediating 
causes of behavior. 
Fourth, the talk could be about explanatory fictions. In traditional psychology, 
this talk is assumed to identify causal events in other, nonbehavioral dimensions. 
Often the talk is justified as being ―theoretical.‖ However, for radical behaviorism 
there are no other dimensions in the sense that traditional psychology envisions. 
Rather, this talk merely reflects the social–cultural traditions of folk psychology. 
According to radical behaviorism, this talk interferes with an effective 
understanding of behavior and may be dismissed as mentalism, notwithstanding its 
theoretical pretensions. Indeed, radical behaviorists regard Western culture as 
decidedly mentalistic, if not dualistic, largely because it embraces this traditional 
conception of the nature and causal status of private events. Because feelings and 
internal states occur at just the right time (i.e., prior to behavior), they are mistaken 
for causes. Even if theorists in traditional psychology relate them to actual events 
inside an individual—and they do not routinely do so, traditional theorists fail to 
assess the extent to which those events are, in turn, functionally related to 
environmental circumstances. The conception of ―Autonomous Man,‖ already at 
great strength because of prevailing social–cultural traditions and folk psychology, 
holds that human behavior is initiated from within. Traditional approaches 
mischievously perpetuate this conception by casting explanatory fictions as private 
events in their theories. 
Overall, the conception of private events as behavioral allows radical 





consistent level without surrendering to mentalism and methodological 
behaviorism disguised in purportedly ―theoretical‖ language. It remains the case 
that one can predict and control both public and private behavior on the basis of 
knowing one’s genetic endowment and the environmental circumstances of the 
past, as well as those circumstances with which an individual is currently in 
contact. 
And that is why the radical behaviorist conception of private events is 
interesting, relevant, and important. 
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